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The Next Step in the Battle Against Forum Shopping:
Unilaterally Adopted Arbitration Clauses
Jamie V. Harrmann*
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon known as multijurisdictional litigation is nothing
new to the legal world; lawyers are always looking for new and savvy
ways to work around unfavorable predictable law in order to achieve
greater benefits in their clients' favor. The most popular savvy way to
work around the system is to forum shop.
About sixty percent of American publicly traded corporations are
incorporated within the state of Delaware.1 Of this sixty percent, it is
likely that many are domiciled in a state other than Delaware. This is
because the "corporation need not be, and frequently is not, head-
quartered in the state where it is incorporated .... ",2 Legally, this
means that shareholders bringing direct and derivative claims against
a corporation not only have more than one choice in deciding where
to file a claim, but also have the possibility of filing multiple suits in
multiple states.3 The intention of the shareholder plaintiffs who en-
gage in this act is to litigate both claims at the same time, resulting in
high litigation costs for the corporation.4
Why do shareholders want to file outside of Delaware courts? In
Delaware, a cast body of corporate precedent developed from the fact
that the majority of corporations are incorporated within the state.5
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University, College of Law, May 2015; B.A. English and Politics,
Drake University, May 2012. The Author would like to thank Andrew Gold, Professor at
DePaul University, College of Law for his guidance and discussion, and the editors of the
DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal for their help in editing and preparing this Note for
publication. Any errors are my own.
1. Sara Lewis, Transforming the "Anywhere but Chancery" Problem into the "Nowhere but
Chancery" Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 199, 200 (2008).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ("a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and
foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its
principal place of business .. "); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 943 (Del. Ch. 2013).
3. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 943.
4. Id.
5. Lewis, supra note 1, at 200.
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This, in turn, creates an extremely predictable forum that tends to
weigh against shareholders. 6
Entering into an unpredictable forum, or multiple forums at the
same time, allows shareholders to scare the directors and officers of
the corporation with the chance of "unpredictable outcomes" and
"long, drawn-out trials."'7 Delaware precedent allows directors, of-
ficers and shareholders of the corporation, alike, to gage what the re-
sult of the trial will be before it starts.8 The result is that corporations
are unlikely to settle for a high value. 9 However, if the corporation is
not able to predict the outcome of the case, or, if it wants to avoid a
lengthy and expensive trial, the possibility of a settlement increases.' 0
Consequently, this movement leads to a major push in corporations to
adopt forum selection clauses in order to limit where shareholder ac-
tions can be brought and to save the corporation valuable time and
money."
In June of 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery approved unilat-
eral director and officer action to adopt forum selection clauses.' 2
These clauses prevent shareholder plaintiffs from seeking multiple ju-
risdictions in which to file. 13 The Court of Chancery's holding in Boil-
ermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., which found a
unilaterally adopted forum selection clause valid and enforceable,
gives corporate directors and officers the tools they need to limit fo-
rum shopping effectively. 14 But, adopting a forum selection bylaw is
not the only answer corporations have to combat shareholder forum
shopping.
What if directors and officers had the ability to prevent litigation
altogether? What happens when directors choose to unilaterally
adopt mandatory arbitration clauses? After all, an arbitration clause
is a "specialized kind of forum selection clause.' 5
Like forum selection clauses, mandatory arbitration bylaws keep
shareholders from filing multiple suits in several jurisdictions, 16 saving
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Lewis, supra note 1, at 201.
11. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 943-44 ("over 250 pub-
licly traded corporations have adopted such provisions").
12. Id. at 963.
13. Id. at 943.
14. Id. at 963.
15. Lewis, supra note 1, at 208 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
16. Emily Farinacci, In a Bind: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Corporate Derivative
Context, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 737, 749 (2013).
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a corporation's valuable time 17 and public fagade. Not only does the
corporation benefit, but shareholders benefit as well because arbitra-
tion provides flexibility in how an issue is resolved: instead of a judge,
the parties will ideally set forth their claims in front of a neutral arbi-
ter.18 Not only do the shareholders have the possibility of benefiting,
but the directors and officers also benefit because arbitration is gener-
ally less costly and is a private matter that occurs behind closed doors
away from public eyes and ears. 19 In effect, this neutral arbiter takes
away the predictability and bias of the Delaware courts, resulting in
the likelihood of a greater settlement.20
Currently, it is unclear whether a Delaware court of law would up-
hold a unilaterally adopted mandatory arbitration bylaw.21 This note
argues that the Delaware Court of Chancery, if presented with the
issue under the same or similar circumstances as presented in Boiler-
makers, would uphold a unilaterally adopted arbitration clause as
valid and enforceable. The following parts provide reasoning and sup-
port for the claim. Part II provides a background analysis leading up
to the issue. It will introduce the problem of forum shopping and pro-
vide an analysis of Revlon, the Delaware decision that opened the
door for forum selection clauses. Part III provides an in depth analy-
sis of Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. and
introduces the relevant common and statutory law the Delaware
Court of Chancery may use in a case questioning the validity of a
mandatory arbitration clause. Part IV discusses how the Delaware
Court of Chancery will likely apply precedent and statutory law and
what possible problems the court may experience. Part V analyzes
the impact the decision will have on corporations and the relationship
between shareholders and corporations. Finally, Part VI provides a
brief summarization of the facts and issues presented.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Revlon: A Breakthrough Case
Although forum selection clauses are common within transactional
exchanges between corporations, prior to 2010, very few forum selec-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 737.
19. Farinacci, supra note 16, at 743, 750.
20. See id. at 751 ("arbitration outcomes need not be based upon rules of law ... .
21. See e.g., Stephen B. Bauerman, Multi-forum Litigation: Delaware Court of Chancery Up-
holds Board-Approved Forum Selection Bylaws, Comments of the Individual Members of the
Exempt Organizations Committee's Task Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, ABA (Nov. 6,
2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publicationsfblt/2013/07/delawareinsider.html.
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tion clauses appeared within the articles of incorporation or bylaws of
corporations.22 It was not until the Revlon2 3 decision of March 16,
2010 that more and more corporations began to add forum selection
clauses to their corporate constitutions.2 4 Though Revlon does not
deal directly with the forum selection bylaw issue, it was Vice Chan-
cellor J. Travis Laster's analysis of how the "frequent filer" issue could
be prevented that gave rise to the possibility of forum selection bylaws
within corporate charters.25
In Revlon, multiple law firms from multiple states filed claims in the
Delaware Chancery regarding the legality of an internal takeover that
effectively gave one shareholder control of over 75% of Revlon's vot-
ing power.26 As a result of the multiple filings, the firms began to
compete for primary control over the litigation.2 7 A month passed
after the date of the original filing before the leadership for plaintiff's
counsel was finally determined.2 8 However, after plaintiffs realized
the counsel "literally did nothing," new counsel filed two more repre-
sentative actions asking Vice Chancellor Laster to determine the lead-
ership structure of the counsel for plaintiff shareholders.2 9 In the end,
Vice Chancellor Laster removed the original counsel and replaced
them with the counsel who filed the representative actions.30
As previously mentioned, it was the Vice Chancellor's analysis on
how this type of frequent filer issue could be prevented that opened
the door to forum selection bylaws. First, Vice Chancellor recognized
that "greater judicial oversight of frequent filers" would push claims
out of the Delaware Chancery and into other jurisdictions. 31 He then
recognized that if shareholder lawyers began to run to other jurisdic-
tions, boards of directors and stockholders of corporations would be
"free to respond" to the flight from Delaware by "selecting an exclu-
22. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate forum Selection
Clauses: an Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 338 (2012) ("1.49% of publicly traded
entities had forum selection provisions in their charters or bylaws." Id. at 389).
23. In re Revlon S'holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010).
24. Grundfest, supra note 22, at 339.
25. Id. at 338. Frequent filers is a phrase then-Vice Chancellor Laster used to describe firms
who frequently file in Delaware on behalf of "stockholder's with small ownership stakes." Rev-
Ion, 990 A.2d at 943.
26. Revlon, 990 A.2d at 943-94. The firms included Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. of
Delaware, Abbey Spanier Rodd & Abrams, LLP of New York, Glancy & Binkow LLP of Cali-
fornia, and Rigrodsky & Long of Florida. Id.
27. Id. at 944.
28. Id. at 946 (the last claim was filed on May 12, 2009 while leadership counsel was deter-
mined by consolidation order entered on June 24, 2009).
29. Id. at 956, 942.
30. Id. at 957, 961.
31. Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960.
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sive forum for intra-entity disputes. '32 Selecting a particular forum
would "provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute res-
olution" and would prevent shareholder lawyers from "facilitating a
system of transactional insurance through quasi-litigation. '33
As a result of the Revlon opinion, many corporations interpret Vice
Chancellor Laster's analysis as a judicial invitation for corporations to
include forum selection clauses as a way of restricting where share-
holders can file claims. As a result, many corporations adopt forum
selection clauses within their bylaws. 34
B. Shareholder Elected and Unilaterally Adopted Bylaws
While Vice Chancellor Laster did suggest corporations use forum
selection clauses to control shareholder litigation, he did not suggest
how corporations are to implement the clauses. 35 As a consequence,
boards of directors are left with two choices in possible routes for
adoption of the forum selection bylaws.36
The first option is for the board of directors to ask for a formal
shareholder vote to approve the bylaws. 37 Stanford Law School Pro-
fessor Joseph Grundfest's article, The History and Evolution of Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, suggests
that there are three ways a board of directors can introduce a forum
selection bylaw to shareholders for a vote. In the first category, the
corporation can bundle the forum selection clause with other share-
holder proposals.38 For example, in these cases, the forum selection
clause can be part of a larger group of clauses. The shareholders will
then vote to incorporate the entire group of clauses as part of its al-
ready existing corporate governance. The second category includes
corporations who rewrite an entirely new charter as a result of
reincorporation. 39 In these situations, the forum selection clause will
already be included within the new charter and the shareholders
would vote to incorporate the entire charter. The third category
32. Id.
33. Id. at 960-61.
34. Grundfest, supra note 23, at 339 ("[the] adoption rate of intra-corporate forum selection
clauses in organic corporate documents ... increased by almost a hundred fold in the wake of
Revlon.").
35. See Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960.
36. See Grundfest, supra note 23, at 340, 342.
37. Id. at 342. Between 2011 and 2012, seven corporations asked for shareholder approval
with five successful cases.
38. Id. at 342, 370.
39. See e.g., id. at 370.
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leaves corporations who propose the forum selection clause, and only
the forum selection clause, to the shareholders for a vote.40
The second option is for the board of directors to avoid the share-
holder vote in its entirety, and unilaterally adopt the bylaws on its
own.41 Chevron and FedEx, among others, fall into this latter cate-
gory and Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp is
the consequence of their actions.
III. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp:
The First Step
In Boilermakers, two separate groups of shareholders filed suit in
the Delaware Court of Chancery ("court") against Chevron Corpora-
tion ("Chevron") and FedEx Corporation ("FedEx"), and their re-
spective Boards of Directors (collectively, the "Board"), for
unilaterally adopting and amending a forum selection bylaw.42
Though Chevron and FedEx were the only two corporations that were
party to this suit, these two actors were not the only businesses share-
holders had claims regarding forum selection clauses against.43 From
February 6 to February 23, 2012, "a dozen complaints" bombarded the
court - all filed by the same law firm.44 Out of the twelve corpora-
tions served with the suit, ten corporations repealed their forum selec-
tion bylaws, leaving Chevron and FedEx.45 As a result of the repeals,
the appropriate courts dismissed the complaints against the ten corpo-
rations.46 Chevron and FedEx refused to repeal their bylaws and an-
swered the complaints, resulting in this case. 47
40. Id. at 370. Category one included Life Technologies Corporation. Category two included
CapTerra Financial Group, Pure Bioscience and Williams-Sonoma. Category three included Al-
tera, DirecTV, Insweb, Lighting Science, and Sally Beauty Holdings. See generally Grundfest,
supra note 22, at 370-373.
41. Id. at 340.
42. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 944 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Though the shareholders of the corporation separately filed suit, the Court combined the cases
under Del. Ch. Ct. R. 42(a) because the "complaints were nearly identical," "present[ed] com-
mon legal issues," and were filed a few days apart by "clients of the same law firm" a few days
apart. Id. at 938.
43. Id. at 944.
44. Id. The date and corporations are as follows: February 6, Priceline.com, Danaher, Curtiss-
Wright, Chevron, AutoNation, and Navistar International; February 7, Franklin Resources, Su-
perior Energy Services, and SPX Corporation; February 13, FedEx and Air Productions &
Chemicals; and finally February 23, Jack in the Box, rounding the total count twelve corpora-
tions. Id. at 944 n. 35.
45. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 945.
46. Id. at 945.
47. Id.
[Vol. 13:183
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Before trial started, then-Vice Chancellor Strine and counsel for
Plaintiff shareholders, Chevron and FedEx held a conference to dis-
cuss how to proceed with the trial.48 The court decided it was best to
decide Count I and Count IV first because if the court found that "if
the bylaws are invalid, then the Plaintiff's other as-applied claims [will
be] moot. '49 But, the court recognized that "if the bylaws are statuto-
rily and contractually valid and enforceable as a facial matter[,]" then
the court would consider the fiduciary duty and other "as-applied
claims."' 50 Based on this decision, the court focused its concern on two
counts; Count I and Count IV. Count I alleged that the Boards went
beyond their authority under the Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL"), and thus the bylaws were "statutorily invalid. ' '51 Count
IV alleged that the bylaws were "contractually invalid" because they
were unilaterally adopted by the Board. 52 Therefore, only the "facial
statutory and contractual validity of the bylaws" would be deter-
mined, and not "how the bylaws might be applied in any future, real-
world situation." 53
1. Delaware Court of Chancery's Finds the Forum Selection
Bylaws Statutorily Valid
To begin with, in Franz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries, the
Delaware Supreme Court previously held that bylaws were presumed
valid and would be construed by the courts in a "manner consistent
with the law."'54 As a result, the Boilermakers court ruled that the
burden was on the Plaintiffs to show that the bylaws did not "address
proper subject matters" as defined by section 109(b) of the DGCL.55
The Plaintiffs attempted to bear this burden by arguing the bylaws
were invalid because they regulated novel, as opposed to traditional,
subject matter.5 6 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the bylaws were
invalid because the Board stepped beyond traditionally regulated in-
ternal matters, such as "stockholder meetings, the board of directors
and its committees, and officerships. ' ' 57 Thus, Plaintiffs argued, the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 945.
51. Id. at 938.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 948. The court combined the separate claims against Chevron and FedEx under
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 42(a) because the actions contained a "common question of
law" and it was more efficient to decide "any or all matters" at once. Id. at 946.
54. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (1985).
55. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 949.
56. Id. at 952.
57. Id. at 951.
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Board was exceeding its statutory authority by regulating beyond, or
external to, internal corporate matters and venturing into novel
territory. 58
The court found Plaintiff's claim and reasoning to be "dubious" for
four reasons. First, the court stated that bylaws had a "procedural,
process-oriented nature" in addition to their statutory internal na-
ture.5 9 By analogizing to advance notice bylaws, the court found that
the act of deciding ahead of time where the shareholders could bring
suit was acting within the internal affairs of the corporation. 60 The
court determined that by deciding what forum shareholders could
bring suit, the Board was governing the internal affairs arising from
the relationship between directors, officers, and shareholders.6' By
making this decision, the Board would effectively prevent a situation
that would likely result in a "chaotic stockholder meeting. '62 There-
fore, because the Board was governing the relationship between the
Board and the shareholders, it was governing the business of the cor-
poration within, and not external to, section 109(b) of the DGCL.
Second, the court recognized the external concern, but reasoned
that because the bylaws regulated procedural matters concerning
"where the stockholder may file suit, not whether the stockholder may
file suit," the bylaws did not limit the "rights and powers of the stock-
holder as a stockholder. ' 63 In other words, because the forum selec-
tion clause did not deprive the shareholders of exercising their right to
go to court, but instead limited where a case could be brought, the
bylaws were not invalid. 64
Third, the court found that the 'novel' subject matter actually was
not 'novel' at all. Prior to this suit, the United States Supreme Court
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 952.
61. Id. at 951-52.
62. Id. at 952.
63. Id. at 952 (emphasis in original). The Chevron bylaw stated as follows:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the
sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf
of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed
by any director, officer or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the
Corporation's stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any
provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a
claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine shall be a state or federal court located
within the state of Delaware, in all cases subject to the court's having personal jurisdiction
over the indispensible parties named as defendants.
Id. at 942 (emphasis in the original).
64. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) (finding it is a shareholder
right to not be "deprived of his day in court").
2014] THE NEXT STEP IN THE BATTLE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING 191
and Delaware Supreme Court both found that forum selection clauses
within limited liability corporation ("LLC") and stockholder agree-
ments were statutorily valid.65
Finally, the fact that the bylaws reached into an unregulated subject
matter did not automatically imply invalidity. 66 Essentially, Plaintiffs
argued the Board was limited by the plain meaning of section 109(b)
and, thus, because the bylaw was invalid, the statute did not plainly
express any authority allowing the Board to regulate the external, or
procedural, affairs. 67 Again, the Boilermakers court did not agree. 68
Following the lead of the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., the court did not recognize section 109(b), or the
rest of the DGCL, as "static. ' 69 Instead, Delaware interpreted the
DGCL as a living document that was meant to "grow and develop in
response to, [and] in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs. '70
Thus, the court found that just because the statute was silent in regard
to a specific matter, the silence did not automatically imply that it was
prohibited.71 Therefore, the Court of Chancery ultimately found that
the bylaws were statutorily valid.72
2. Delaware Court of Chancery finds the Forum Selection Bylaw
Contractually Valid
Although the Court of Chancery held the bylaws statutorily valid,
the court had to decide whether the bylaws were contractually valid. 73
In defense of Count IV, Plaintiffs argued that the unilaterally adopted
forum selection law was not enforceable because the shareholders did
not get the opportunity to vote for or against the adoption of the by-
law. 74 Though the clause passed without the opportunity to vote, the
court found the shareholders impliedly consented to the bylaw. 75 The
implied consent was established by a shareholder purchasing or keep-
65. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 953 (citing Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffair, 727 A.2d 286
(Del. 1999); Baker v. Impact Hldg., Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111, at *1 (Del.
Ch. May 13, 2010)). See infra Part IV.
66. Id. at 953.
67. Id. at 951, 953.
68. Id. at 953.
69. Id. at 953; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del 1985) (quotation
omitted).
70. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 953; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.
71. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 953; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957; see e.g. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deut-
scher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (2014) (finding fee-shifting bylaws were legally possible
because "neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute forbid[ ] the enactment .
72. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 954-55.
75. Id. at 956.
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ing stock while having notice that the board had the power, as pro-
vided by the articles of incorporation, to adopt an arbitration clause
without shareholder approval.76
Plaintiffs first argued that the bylaw was invalid because the vested
rights doctrine restricts the board from "dimish[ing] or divest[ing] pre-
existing shareholder rights" without the consent of the shareholders. 77
However, the Court of Chancery, in Kidsco Inc. v. Disnmore, found
the vested rights doctrine was inapplicable to shareholder claims
where the shareholders had notice that the Board had the possibility
of making unilateral bylaws. 78 Because both Chevron's and FedEx's
articles of incorporation gave the Board the power to adopt and
amend bylaws, former and new shareholders alike had notice of the
possibility that the Board would enforce their power. Therefore, the
court held the claim did not fall within the vested rights doctrine. 79
The court did not end the argument with the vested rights doctrine.
Instead, the court moved on to explain exactly why the shareholders
were, or should have been, notified of this possibility.80 Ultimately,
the court found the corporation, shareholders and Board all con-
sented not only to be bound by the DGCL, but also to be bound to
the possibility of unilateral Board action.81
At the beginning of its analysis, the court found that before the cor-
poration formed, shareholders and directors had the option to seek
forums outside of the state of Delaware in which to incorporate. 82
However, because the corporation, shareholders and directors all
chose Delaware to incorporate, Delaware law bound them all. 83
Next, the court reasoned that because the shareholders were incor-
porated under Delaware corporate law, the roles of the shareholders
and directors were determined by section 109(a) of the DGCL.84
Under section 109(a), the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
transfers to a board only if the corporation provides so within the arti-
76. Id.
77. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956.
78. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (finding that this Court has
held that where a corporation's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at
any time, no vested rights can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment). See also
Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del. Ch. 1988).
79. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939-40.
80. Id. at 956.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 958.
84. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(a); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956-57.
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cles of incorporation.85 Thus, by voting for the articles of incorpora-
tion or by buying the corporation's stock after the articles were
written, the shareholders consented to this possibility and "explicitly
allow[ed]" the Board to draft, amend, and implement the forum selec-
tion bylaws.8 6
Despite the fact that the shareholders gave their power to amend
and adopt to the Board, Plaintiffs argued that shareholders still had a
right to vote to approve the bylaws.87 Plaintiff's reasoned that share-
holder consent ended when the power was dedicated to the Board.88
Thus, when the Board takes the next step and enforces the right, the
shareholders need to confirm the move.8 9 However, the court stated
that once the articles of incorporation were filed, the consent created
a binding contract, which in turn created an overarching consent to
the Board's actions.90 As such, the court determined that the bylaw
was not only statutorily valid, but also contractually binding under
Delaware law. 91
In closing, the court recognized the continuous tug-of-war between
shareholder and Board authority and determined that shareholders
had multiple protections against unsatisfactory unilateral Board deci-
sions. 92 For example, although the articles of incorporation gave the
power to the Board to create and amend bylaws, the shareholder right
in the same process never disappeared. 93 Instead, the shareholders
still reserved the right to repeal, amend, or adopt a new bylaw thereby
replacing the unilaterally adopted bylaw. 94 After all, neither bylaws,
nor articles of incorporation are permanent. 95 Because the sharehold-
ers reserved their rule-making right, they provide a check on the ac-
tions of the directors, theoretically resulting in bylaws pleasing both
parties. 96
In addition, another protection the shareholders possessed was the
power to vote to replace or oust directors when they are up for elec-
85. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(a) ("[Alny corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation,
confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.").
86. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 956.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 958.
92. Id. at 956-57.
93. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(a); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956.
94. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(a); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956.
95. Id. at 956-57.
96. Id. at 956.
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tion.97 Not only does this provide another check on director actions, it
also allows the shareholders to elect a person whose views reflect that
of the shareholder. 98
The final protection the court mentioned was the protection share-
holders get by subjecting the bylaws to "as-applied" review when
within the courts. 99 In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, the United States
Supreme Court held forum selection clauses would be presumed valid
if they were adopted "unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or over-
weening bargaining power.. . ."100 However, Bremen found that the
clauses could be found to be invalid in real-world situations, as op-
posed to hypothetical situations, if the bylaws were found to be "un-
reasonabl[e] and unjust[ ]" as-applied. 01 Therefore, when a court
finds the bylaw to be reasonable and just as-applied, the bylaw is
found to be valid. 10 2
In the end, the Delaware Court of Chancery found the bylaws were
both statutorily valid and contractually valid. 10 3 The result from the
case not only allowed Chevron and FedEx to keep and enforce the
forum selection clauses, but it also opened the door for directors and
officers in other corporations, under the same or similar circum-
stances, to adopt forum selection clauses without the need of share-
holder approval.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Next Step: Unilaterally Passed, Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses
Court precedent is not only used to clarify questions of law, but it
can also be used to provide guidelines regarding how actors are sup-
posed to act in certain situations. Through its opinion in Boilermak-
ers, the Delaware Court of Chancery provided a road map to answer
the question regarding what a board of directors of a Delaware incor-
porated corporation can do in order to have valid and enforceable
forum selection bylaws. Now that the question regarding forum selec-
tion bylaws has been answered, the next logical question would be to
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 957.
100. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972); see also Nat'l Indus. Gp. v. Car-
lyle Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 67 A.3d 373, 381 (Del. 2013) (applying the Bremen test); Ingres Corp. v.
CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010) (applying the Bremen test).
101. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 957.
102. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 957.
103. Id. at 963.
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ask whether the same outcome would result if, under the same or sim-
ilar circumstances as Boilermakers, an arbitration clause unilaterally
adopted by a board of directors would be upheld.
As mentioned above, the court in Boilermakers provided a road
map regarding the question of whether a forum selection bylaw was
valid and enforceable. This road map will indicate that, if the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery is presented with the question of whether a
unilaterally adopted arbitration bylaw is valid and enforceable under
the same or similar circumstances as presented in Boilermakers, the
Court of Chancery would uphold the bylaw.
In order to come to this determination, the court would have to
follow the same analysis as Boilermakers, with possibly one exception.
In Boilermakers, the court used state common law to determine that
forum selection bylaws were presumed valid until proven that they
were "[affected] by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power"' 04 or found to be "unreasonabl[e] and unjust[ ]" as-applied. 10 5
Because Boilermakers dealt with a forum selection clause governed by
state common law, and this scenario deals with an arbitration clause
governed by statute, the first question answer is whether the analysis
differs given the distinction.
Unlike forum selection, state and federal statutes govern arbitra-
tion. Depending on the circumstances of the case and the content of
the arbitration clause, the arbitration clause could either be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 10 6 or, in Delaware, the Dela-
ware Uniform Arbitration Act ("DUAA"). 10 7 Therefore, unlike the
analysis for forum selection clauses that rely primarily on federal and
state common law, the analysis for arbitration clauses has to take into
account federal and state arbitration statutes in addition to federal
and state common law. Luckily, however, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has provided a test regarding this issue in DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Matthews.10 8
B. DaimlerChrysler and the Test for Validity and Enforceability
In DaimlerChrysler, Defendant purchased a defective truck from
his employer, Plaintiff. 10 9 At the closing of the purchase, Defendant
signed the "Employee New Vehicle Purchase/Lease Claim Form"
104. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
105. Id. at 16; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d, at 957.
106. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
107. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 5701.
108. 848 A.2d 577, 581-82 (Del. Ch. 2004).
109. Id. at 578.
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("Claim Form") that provided all disputes would be resolved by the
"DaimlerChrysler Vehicle Resolution Process, which includes
mandatory arbitration that is binding on both DaimlerChrysler and
[Defendant].""10 After Defendant had multiple issues with the truck,
he moved to follow the "Customer Arbitration Process" but was de-
nied because "he did not meet [the programs] residency require-
ments."11 ' When Defendant filed suit, Plaintiff offered Defendant the
arbitration option, but defendant denied.112 Plaintiff then filed a peti-
tion to compel Defendant to submit to arbitration. 13 The court was
asked to determine whether the "arbitration provision in the Claim
Form requires Defendant to submit all his claims to binding
arbitration. "114
The first question the Delaware Court of Chancery encountered
was whether the arbitration agreement, or clause, was binding. 115 To
answer this question, the court had to decide which test to use for
determining whether an arbitration clause was valid and enforceable.
The court, knowing that the issue was governed by statute, turned to
the FAA and DUAA for guidance and ultimately found the arbitra-
tion clause was not binding.116
The Delaware Court of Chancery found that both the FAA and the
DUAA presumed arbitration agreements "valid, enforceable and ir-
revocable, 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.""17 In other words, the arbitration agree-
ment would be presumed valid and enforceable only if the contract
between the Plaintiff and Defendant was valid and enforceable. If the
contract was invalid under law or if one party breached, "the non-
breaching [sic] party [would be] entitled to treat the contract as termi-
nated, i.e., as being at an end.""118 Thus, in this situation, the
arbitration clause would not be enforceable.
In sum, DaimlerChrysler provides that an arbitration clause is only
as valid as the contract between the parties questioning the ability to
arbitrate."19 Therefore, the distinction in between the forum selection
110. Id. at 578-579.
111. Id. at 580.
112. Id.
113. DaimlerChrysler, 848 A.2d at 580.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 581.
116. Id. at 581, 583.
117. Id. at 581 (quoting DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 5701 (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis
added)).
118. DaimlerChrysler, 848 A.2d at 582.
119. Id. at 581.
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clause analysis and the arbitration clause analysis is null; the validity
of both the forum selection and arbitration clause rests on the validity
of the contract supporting the clause.
C. Elf Atochem and Corvex: Previous Arbitration Examples
1. Elf Atochem: A Delaware LLC Example
As previously mentioned, the Boilermakers Court found forum se-
lection clauses were not novel, because the Delaware Supreme Court
previously analyzed the issue within the context of a limited liability
corporation ("LLC") in Elf Atochem North America v. Jaffori.1 20
However, not only did Elf Atochem analyze a forum selection bylaw,
it also analyzed an arbitration bylaw as well.
In Elf Atochem, Plaintiff and Defendants agreed to form a LLC,
which was governed by a series of agreements. 121 The most important
of these was the Agreement, which was "a comprehensive and inte-
grated documents ... setting forth detailed provisions for the govern-
ance of [the] LLC. ' ' 122 All parties signed the Agreement, with the
exception of the LLC.123
When the company failed to take off, Plaintiff failed suit in Dela-
ware alleging breach of fiduciary duties among other claims. 124 The
Defendants moved for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Agreement. 25 Within the Agreement
were separate arbitration and forum selection clauses.1 26 The arbitra-
tion clause provided that "any controversy or dispute arising out of
this Agreement, the interpretation of any of the provisions hereof, or
the action or inaction of any Member or Manager hereunder shall be
submitted to arbitration in San Francisco, California. ' '127 The forum
selection clause provided that the members agreed to California as the
"exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts . . . [for] any
action on a claim arising out of, under or in connection with this
Agreement, provided such claim is not required to be arbitrated pur-
suant to [the arbitration clause]. 1 28 Due to the arbitration and forum
120. 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999).
121. Id. at 288.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 289.
125. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 289.
126. Id. at 288.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 288-89.
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selection clauses, the Court of Chancery agreed with Defendants and
dismissed the case.129
Plaintiff appealed the decision claiming that the "Court of Chancery
erred in holding that the arbitration and forum selection clauses in the
Agreement governed .... "130 Plaintiff argued that the forum selec-
tion clauses did not govern because the LLC never signed the Agree-
ment and, thus, was "not bound to the forum selection
agreements."'1 31 The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed and found
that the LLC did not have to sign the Agreement to be bound to the
Agreement. The court held that under the Delaware Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act ("Delaware LLC Act"), only the "member or mem-
bers" had to sign the agreement because the members "are the real
parties in interest," not the LLC.132 Therefore, although the LLC did
not sign the Agreement, and, thus, the members who formed the LLC
did, the LLC was bound by the arbitration and forum selection
clauses.
Second, the Plaintiffs argued that Court of Chancery erred in char-
acterizing Plaintiff's claim as a direct suit instead of a derivative
suit.133 The Delaware Supreme Court found that the characterization
was irrelevant because Plaintiff contracted its right away in the Agree-
ment.1 34 In other words, because the Agreement failed to "distinguish
between direct and derivative claims" within the arbitration and fo-
rum selection clauses, it did not matter whether the claim was charac-
terized as derivative of direct135 Instead, Plaintiff agreed that "any
claim arising out of or related to this Agreement" would either be
arbitrated or heard before a court in California. 136 Thus, Plaintiff's
second argument was failed.137
Third, Plaintiff argued that, even if the LLC was bound to the
Agreement, the clauses were invalid under the Delaware LLC Act,
specifically section 18-109(d). 138 In particular, Plaintiff argued that
the Delaware LLC Act specifically granted the Court of Chancery
"subject matter jurisdiction over its claims for breach of fiduciary duty
... even though the parties contracted to arbitrate all such claims in
129. Id. at 289.
130. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 289.
131. Id. at 289.
132. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 18-101(7); id. at 293.
133. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 289.
134. Id. at 293-94.
135. Id. at 294.
136. Id. (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 295.
138. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 289.
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California.' '1 39 Again, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed. a40
First, the court held that it was "the policy of the Act... to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract," and, thus,
the parties were allowed to contract out of the statute for a more con-
venient forum.141 In addition, the court noted that its decision was
"bolstered by the fact that Delaware recognizes a strong public policy
in favor of arbitration," when there is no doubt 'of the intention to
arbitrate.142 Here, because all members of the LLC signed the Agree-
ment, the court found no evidence of the doubt to arbitrate. 143
Then, the Court analyzed section 18-109(d) of the act, which
provides
a member or members may consent to be subject to the nonexclu-
sive jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, a specified juris-
diction, or the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of
Delaware, or the exclusivity of arbitration in a specified jurisdiction
of the State of Delaware. 144
Plaintiff believed this section "prohibit[ed] vesting exclusive jurisdic-
tion in a court outside of Delaware" and, hence, the arbitration and
forum selection clauses were invalid.' 45 The Delaware Supreme
Court disagreed and found that the section "delineated options for
subject matter jurisdiction," but that the parties did not have to
choose solely from these options.' 46 The Court reasoned that if the
"General Assembly intended to prohibit the parties from vesting ex-
clusive jurisdiction in arbitration or court proceedings in another
state, it could have proscribed such an option. ' 147 But, just because
the Assembly was silent on the matter did not mean that "parties must
agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign jurisdiction.' 148
In the end, the Delaware Supreme Court found that both the arbi-
tration and forum selection provisions were enforceable and, as a re-
sult, affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. 49
The Elf Atochem analysis provides two important points in regard
to whether a Delaware court will uphold an unilaterally passed,
mandatory arbitration clause. First, Elf Atochem enforces the stan-
139. Id. at 295.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 295.
144. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 18-109(d); id.
145. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 296.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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dard that it is the public policy of Delaware courts to uphold a
mandatory arbitration clause if there is not any doubt that the parties
agree to arbitrate.150 As the Boilermakers provided, shareholders give
their consent to the directors, and thus to arbitrate, when they buy or
keep their shares in the company. 151 Second, it shows that the Dela-
ware courts are consistently interpreting silence as the freedom to act,
as opposed to the prohibition of action. In other words, just because a
statute is silent, or fails to provide an answer as to what actors can or
cannot do, the lack of guidance does not automatically imply that the
act is prohibited. 152 Therefore, because the DGCL allows sharehold-
ers to defer the power to adopt, amend and repeal to the directors, but
is silent as to exactly what this entails for the directors, it does not
automatically mean that directors lack the ability to unilaterally adopt
clauses.
2. Corvex: A Maryland Comparison
Similar to DaimlerChrysler and Elf Atochem cases, Corvex analyzes
the issue of whether an arbitration clause is enforceable. a53 Unlike
the employer-employee, buyer-seller relationship of DaimlerChrysler,
Corvex analyzes the issue in regard to the shareholder-corporation re-
lationship, which provides a helpful example to how a Delaware court
may analyze the issue.
In Corvex, the Plaintiffs owned 4.90% of Defendant's shares of the
company 54 and were in the process of entering into an "unsolicited,
hostile takeover" of the Defendant's corporation. 5 5 Defendant tried
to combat the takeover by moving to enforce its arbitration bylaw, but
Plaintiffs ignored the notion and filed suit in court in order to enforce
the transaction. 56
Defendant's bylaws included a clause stating:
Any disputes, claims or controversies brought by or on behalf of
any shareholder of the Trust... shall, on the demand of any party to
such Dispute, be resolved through binding and final arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules (the "Rules") of
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 157
150. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 295.
151. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956.
152. See id. at 953; Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 296.
153. Corvex Mgmt., LP v. Commonwealth Reit, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS
3, *5 (May 8, 2013).
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *5-6.
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As a result of the Bylaw and in defense to the takeover, Plaintiffs
claimed that Defendant's breached their fiduciary obligations to the
shareholders and filed a Petition to Stay Arbitration. 158 Defendants
then filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Petition to Stay Arbitration. 15 9
Plaintiffs, in return, claimed that the arbitration clause was not en-
forceable "for the simple reason that the Plaintiffs never assented to
them" because they believed that an "explicit agreement is essential
to the formation of an enforceable arbitration contract. ' 160 There-
fore, the threshold question before the Maryland Circuit Court was
whether the arbitration clause was a "valid and enforceable"
agreement. 161
In its analysis on whether the arbitration clause was enforceable,
the Maryland Circuit Court had to determine whether the "parties
[had] knowledge of and [had] consented to an arbitration agree-
ment. ' 162 The reasoning is that the presumption in favor of arbitra-
tion does not apply unless 1) there is an agreement between the
parties to arbitrate and 2) the claim arose within the scope of the arbi-
tration agreement. 163
Initially, Plaintiffs argued that because they did not expressly agree
to the arbitration clause, they were not parties to the arbitration
agreement. 164 The court rejected this argument for two reasons. One,
the Maryland Circuit Court determined that an express agreement to
arbitration was too high of a hurdle for the purpose of enforceabil-
ity.1 65 In fact, the court found that both the FAA and Supreme Court
precedent rejected the notion that arbitration agreements had to be
"'express' and 'unequivocal' in order to be enforced. ' 166 Thus, when
compared to "other contracts under state contract principles," the ar-
bitration clause should be on "equal footing.' 167
The Maryland Circuit Court rejected this argument for another rea-
son because the Plaintiffs had both constructive and actual knowledge
of the arbitration clause.1 68 The court determined that Plaintiffs had
158. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *3.
159. Id. at *1.
160. Id. at *24 (quoting Kirleis v. Dickey, McCantey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 162-63
(3d Cir. 2009)).
161. Id. at *8-9.
162. Id. at *23.
163. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *13.
164. Id. at *20.
165. Id. at *26.
166. Id. (citing First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
167. Id. at *25.
168. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *29-30.
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constructive knowledge from obtaining the stock. 169 Specifically, the
court noted that the stock certificate bore the legend:
This Certificate and the shares evidenced hereby are issued and
shall be held subject to all of the provisions of the Declaration of
Trust and Bylaws of the Trust and any amendments thereto. The
holder of this Certificate and every transferee or assignee hereof by
accepting or holding the same agrees to be bound by all of the pro-
visions of the Declaration of Trust and Bylaws of the trust, as
amended from time to time.170
Therefore, when the Plaintiffs purchased the shares to the corpora-
tion, they knew their shares were subject to the bylaws of the com-
pany and, thus, were subject to the possibility of an arbitration
clause. 17' The court also determined that the Plaintiffs had actual no-
tice of the arbitration clause from their due diligence because both
"apparently investigated and analyzed [Defendant's] Bylaws prior to
purchasing stock.' 72
The next question the Corvex court had to determine was whether
there was mutual assent and consideration of the arbitration clause. 173
The court found that both parties mutually assented, but in arguably
different forms. 174 On one side of the contract, Plaintiffs voluntarily
assented to the agreement when individual shareholders decided to
purchase shares of Defendant's stock. 175 On the other side, the De-
fendant's assented to the arbitration clause through its obligation to
arbitrate if the Plaintiffs brought a claim under the arbitration agree-
ment. 76 In other words, if a situation arose where the Defendants
wanted to litigate the issue before a judge but the Plaintiffs wanted to
arbitrate, the Defendants would have to arbitrate the issue.' 77 Thus,
in the end, the court found the arbitration clause was valid and en-
forceable and ultimately denied Plaintiffs' Petition to Stay
Arbitration. 178
The analysis presented by the Maryland Circuit Court in Corvex is
analogous to the argument the Delaware Court of Chancery made in
Boilermakers. In Boilermakers, the court argued that express share-
holder approval (i.e. shareholder vote) was not necessary because the
169. Id. at *29.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *29-30.
172. Id. at *30.
173. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *29.
174. Id. at *36.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *36.
178. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *47.
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shareholders, by purchasing shares within the corporation incorpo-
rated under the laws of Delaware, "assent[ed] to not having to assent
to board-adopted bylaws." 179 Thus, comparatively, both the Maryland
Circuit Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery find that express,
as well as implied assent, are sufficient to support a finding of validity.
Also, though it was not explicitly stated within the Boilermakers deci-
sion, both courts alluded to the fact that both parties would be con-
fined to the location designated by the applicable clause.180
D. Applying the Facts
Based on the above, all prior case law suggests that a Delaware
court will validate a unilaterally passed, mandatory arbitration clause.
First, the Board must have the authority to adopt the bylaw. This is
because an arbitration clause is only presumed valid, according to the
DaimlerChrysler test 181 and as evidenced by the Corvex,18 2 if the con-
tract is valid. Under these circumstances, the arbitration bylaw would
represent the contract between the shareholders and the corporation.
If the bylaw is enforceable, then the arbitration clause is valid.
Second, the articles of incorporation must delegate the authority to
"adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws" to the Board. 18 3 The reasoning be-
hind this, is that section 109(a) of the DGCL provides that
"[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its certifi-
cate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal by-
laws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstick [sic] corporation,
upon its governing body. '18 4 The Boilermakers court determined that
this action of delegation represents the shareholders' consent to the
board to make or change bylaws. 185 Therefore, under the DGCL, if
the articles of incorporation provide that the board of directors has
the right to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws, the bylaws become valid
and enforceable without shareholder consent.
Next, the bylaw will have to regulate the correct subject matter. In
order for the bylaw to be valid and enforceable, it must "relat[e] to
179. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch.
2013).
180. See id. at 943-44 (providing that Chevron and FedEx added the clause as a way to "mini-
mize or eliminate the risk ... of duplicative litigation"); Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at
*36.
181. DaimlerChrysler, 848 A.2d at 581.
182. Corvex, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *47.
183. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(a).
184. Id.
185. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (Del. Ch.
2013).
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the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights
or powers" and cannot "inconsistent with law or with the certificate of
incorporation."l 8 6
In regard to these limitations, the Boilermakers court found that the
unilaterally adopted bylaws were valid and enforceable if they regu-
lated internal matters as opposed to external matters.18 7 By regulat-
ing internal matters, the board would simultaneously be regulating
"the business of the corporation" and keeping consistent "with the
certificate of incorporation. 18 8
For this issue, the Court provided that if the bylaw dealt with the
"rights and powers of the . . . stockholder as a stockholder" then it
would be regulating an internal matter.'8 9 However, if the bylaw
"purported to bind a plaintiff," for a personal tort (i.e. a suit arising
from an injury at work) or contract (i.e. a suit arising from a private
individuals undertaking with the corporation) the bylaw would be
reaching beyond the board's authority because it would no longer be
regulating the "stockholder as a stockholder.' 90 In other words, the
bylaw would be regulating what the stockholder could or could not do
outside of its corporate capacity and, thus, would be regulating an ex-
ternal matter. In these situations, the board would be reaching be-
yond its authority. 19'
In regard to internal matters, the Court found that "bylaws, which
help organize what could otherwise be a chaotic stockholder meeting
... [or] a chaotic filing of duplicative and inefficient derivative and
corporate suits against the directors and the corporations" regulate
the stockholders in their corporate capacity and, thus, regulate inter-
nal matters. 192 Thus, because the arbitration clause would, in this hy-
pothetical, govern the stockholders in their corporate capacity, it
would be regulating an internal matter. As a result, under these cir-
cumstances it is likely that the Delaware Court of Chancery would
find this unilaterally passed, mandatory arbitration clause valid and
enforceable.
186. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(b).
187. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 952.
188. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109(b).
189. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 952.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 952.
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V. IMPACT
A. Should Corporations Take the Next Step and Adopt Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses?
As with any court decision, there will be positive and negative im-
plications from a ruling upholding a unilaterally adopted mandatory
arbitration clause. First, a positive outcome of a unilaterally adopted
arbitration clause is that it will help the corporation control where a
possible dispute would be settled. However, under that same note, a
negative outcome is that the corporation will have to labor to deter-
mine the scope of the clause and expressly, precisely and clearly state
what type of issue the clause is intended to cover.
For example, in Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., the
Delaware Court of Chancery was presented with an arbitration clause
between contracting parties and was asked to determine whether the
arbitration clause was valid and, second, whether the fiduciary duty
claims arose within the scope of the arbitration clause.193 In order to
determine whether the claim was arbitrable, the court had to deter-
mine 1) "whether the arbitration clause [was] broad or narrow in
scope" and 2) "whether the claim [fell] within the scope of the con-
tractual provisions that require[d] arbitration.1 94 If the scope is nar-
row, then the claim will be arbitrated if it relates precisely to the
claims provided within the provision. 195 If the scope is broad, then the
court "will defer to arbitration on any issues that touch on contract
rights or contract performance.' 96
In analyzing the fiduciary duty claims, the Delaware Supreme Court
in Parfi determined that the "separate rights pursued by plaintiffs"
under the contract had to be analyzed rather than the "conduct that
led to potential claims.' 97 In addition, the court determined that the
fiduciary duty claims were beyond the contract and "rest[ed] on an
independent set of rights provided for in the Delaware corporation
law" as opposed to the "short-lived obligations bargained for in the
[agreement.] 1 98 Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
"absent a clear expression of an intent to arbitrate breach of fiduciary
duty claims," the claims would be heard within the Delaware court
system.199
193. 817 A.2d 149, 154-155 (Del. 2002).
194. Id. at 155.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 156 (emphasis in original).
198. Parfi, 817 A.2d at 158.
199. Id. at 160.
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Therefore, this case brings to light two important points. First, the
court is strict in their analysis of what is covered by the language of
the arbitration clause. Second, the corporation can include a broad
arbitration clause, but must expressly state claims, such as a breach of
fiduciary duty, if the corporation intends to the arbitration clause to
cover such claims. Or, in the alternative, expressly state which claims
are not to be arbitrated. Though determining what claims to include
within the clause will be tedious, it may be beneficial for the corpora-
tion because it will force the corporation to analyze which potential
claims are better suited for litigation and which are better suited for
arbitration. Otherwise, as explained above, despite the corporation's
best efforts, the clause will not guarantee that the corporation will stay
out of court.
There are other factors the corporation needs to take into account
other than whether a particular claim is better litigated or arbitrated.
Broadly speaking, the corporation needs to conduct a cost benefit
analysis regarding the negative and positive implications a mandatory
arbitration clause may have on the corporation. For example, al-
though there is no guarantee that the arbitration proceeding will take
less time than going to court, the ability to control the situation means
that the corporation can spend more time making improvements to
the corporation which will likely result in a greater economic value for
the corporation.200 This is not only good for corporate business and
its governance; it is also beneficial for the shareholders. The more
time and money the corporation is able to save, the more profit the
corporation is likely to make. The more profit the corporation makes,
the higher the dividend the shareholder could possibly receive for
owning shares or the higher the stock price.
Another shareholder benefit is the fact that the shareholders will
not have to take into account the expense that going to court will have
on the corporation and, thus, will have on their dividend or the corpo-
rations stock prices. Though shareholders bring claims on behalf of
the corporation to save the corporation from wrongdoings of the di-
rectors, the act of going to court itself costs the corporation even if the
money, say for embezzling, is returned. Also, there is nothing to indi-
cate that the shareholders will win if they go to court. In these cases,
the shareholders not only lose the case, but the money the corporation
spends going to trial will no longer be available for shareholder
dividends.
200. Farinacci, supra note 16, at 752.
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While it may be beneficial for the corporate world to have the abil-
ity to adopt mandatory arbitration clauses, it may also be a detriment.
For one, it affords Delaware law and corporations alike limited pre-
dictability. First, if corporations are able to use these clauses to pre-
vent shareholders from reaching the courtroom altogether there is a
possibility that the predictability established by precedent of the Dela-
ware courts will slowly decrease over time.20 1 The more cases that go
to arbitration, the less precedent there is for corporate in-house law-
yers to use to consult the board of directors prior to making business
decisions.
Second, because the arbitration proceedings usually happen behind
closed doors and likely do not reach the public,20 2 the outcome of the
proceedings may not be uniform.203 Along with uniformity, the out-
come may be ad hoc.20 4 Although the negotiated law of the agree-
ment will govern the arbitration proceeding, it is difficult to say
whether an arbiter is qualified to make the decision.20 5 For example,
an arbiter may be chosen for the sole reason that he is a specialist in a
certain area of business, not necessarily due to his experience with the
law. 20 6 However, although the individual is a specialist, there is no
indication that that individual will be able to correctly apply the law to
the facts of the case because he may not be familiar with how to cor-
rectly read or interpret the precedent or law.
Another possible issue is the fact that once an arbitral award is de-
cided, the award is very difficult, but not impossible, to appeal.20 7
Once an arbiter renders a final judgment, the path the parties have to
take to overturn the award may be more troubling and expensive than
if the parties litigated the issue in the first place.
Take Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. for example.2 08
In Travelers, Plaintiff asked the court, via motion of summary judg-
ment, to enforce an arbitration award that was made in favor of Plain-
201. See W. Mark. C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (2012).
202. Cf. id. at 1095 (finding that arbitrators in employment and class action hearings "rou-
tinely write lengthy awards that are substantially devoted to legal analysis and that often make
extensive use of precedent.")
203. Farinacci, supra note 16, at 752.
204. See Weidemaier, supra note 168, at 1095.
205. Farinacci, supra note 16, at 752.
206. See Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitrators, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N 1, available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003878
(last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
207. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 886 A.2d 46, 46 (Del. Ch. 2005).
208. Id.
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tiff and which Defendant refused to pay.20 9 In response, Defendant
filed a cross-motion of summary judgment to vacate the award. 210
The court noted that though "a decision reached by an arbitration
panel is not reviewed on the merits by Delaware courts," if the situa-
tion meets one of the five statutory grounds for vacating an award, the
award will be thrown out.211 However, the court noted that if there is
evidence of a "manifest disregard of the law" the arbitration award
would be vacated. 212
Thus, this case provides that there are two ways in which a corpora-
tion can vacate an award. The first way is for the corporation to show
that the issue meets one of the five statutory grounds provided in the
DUAA. Specifically, the corporation must show:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neu-
tral except where the award was by confession, or corruption in any
of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor, or refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to
the provisions of § 5706 of this title, or failed to follow the proce-
dures set forth in this chapter, so as to prejudice substantially the
rights of a party, unless the party applying to vacate the award con-
tinued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without
objection; or
(5) There was no valid arbitration agreement, or the agreement to
arbitrate had not been complied with, or the arbitrated claim was
barred by limitation and the party applying to vacate the award did
not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection.2 13
If the issue does not fit within one of these statutory grounds, the cor-
poration's only other option is to show the award was made in mani-
fest disregard of the law. 214 If the corporation can prove that one of
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id. at 51.
211. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 5714(a); Travelers, 886 A.2d at 51.
212. Travelers, 886 A.2d at 48.
213. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 5714(a).
214. Travelers, 886 A.2d at 48.
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these two ways occurred, then there is a possibility, even if it is a small
one, that the corporation will be able to vacate the award.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Note showed the progression and interaction of
law and business surrounding the issue of forum shopping. A possible
solution stemmed from a quick mention of the possibility of a forum
selection clause in Revlon. Then-Vice Chancellor Strine's suggestion
that corporations should take a pro-active step through their corpo-
rate governance spurred a movement by corporations to get these fo-
rum selection clauses into their articles of incorporation and bylaws by
any means possible. The result was Boilermakers, a case providing a
road map for how corporations can achieve the goal of getting a fo-
rum selection bylaw within its corporate governance without a prior
shareholder vote.
This Note then analyzed the next logical step: the enforceability of
arbitration clauses. In particular, this Note argued that if the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery were presented with the issue under the same
or similar circumstances as presented in Boilermakers, it would up-
hold a unilaterally adopted arbitration clause as valid and enforceable.
In summary, while there is a legal possibility that an arbitration
clause may be upheld as valid and enforceable, a corporation should
do its due diligence and decide exactly why it wants to adopt an arbi-
tration clause and then write the clause in accordance with those val-
ues. Because, as Parfi presented, there is no guarantee that adopting
an arbitration clause will keep a corporation out of court.
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